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I
INTRODUCTION

With the increased use of alternative dispute resolution techniques in
corporate and securities law,' we have reached the point Justice Frankfurter
addressed in SEC v. Chenery Corp. ,2 where we might inquire: "But to say that
an alternative dispute resolution technique is appropriate only begins the
analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry, which alternative dispute
resolution technique is appropriate? How should it be structured?"
I urge that we would do well to study Continental civil procedure, in
particular its concept of an investigative judge, for suggestions of how to
refine our existing alternative dispute resolution procedures in shareholder
derivative litigation. Professor Langbein, for example, in an enthusiastic
description of the former German method of civil procedure ("German
model"), has emphasized the advantages of judicial fact gathering in
streamlining discovery, selection of expert witnesses, and encouragement of
settlements. Langbein suggests that the German model is preferable to
"[o]ur lawyer-dominated system of civil procedure," which he characterizes as
"often .. . criticized both for its incentives to distort evidence and for the

expense and complexity of its modes of discovery and trial." 3 . Specifically,
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1. See discussion of special litigation committee in shareholder derivative litigation in text
accompanying notes 12 and 29; for a comparison of arbitration in securities broker-customer
disputes, see generally Shearson/American Express, Inc. v McMahon, 482 US 220 (1987); Center for
Public Resources, Model ADR Procedures: ADR in Securities Disputes (Center for Pub Res, 1991).
2. 318 US 80, 85-86 (1943).
3. John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U Chi L Rev 823, 823 (1985).
For a more skeptical view, compare Samuel R. Gross, The American Advantage: The Value of Inefficient
Litigation, 85 Mich L Rev 734 (1985).
In 1977 Germany enacted sweeping civil procedure reforms, making its system more similar to
the Anglo-American method. For a comparison of the former German system (referred to in this
article) with its modem counterpart, see Arthur T. von Mehren, Some Comparative Reflections on First
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Langbein emphasizes two fundamental differences between German and
Anglo-American civil procedures:
First, the court rather than the parties' lawyers takes the main responsibility for
gathering and sifting evidence, although the lawyers exercise a watchful eye over the
court's work. Second, there is no distinction between pretrial and trial, between
discovering evidence and presenting it. Trial is not a single continuous event. Rather,
the court gathers and 4 evaluates evidence over a series of hearings, as many as the
circumstances require.

Recently I had the opportunity to apply a somewhat similar procedure in a
shareholder

derivative

suit.

In

1989,

Michigan

amended

its Business

Corporation Act to allow a court, under specified circumstances, to appoint a
"disinterested person" to perform fact-gathering functions similar to those of

a German investigative judge. 5 In 1991 I was appointed to be the
disinterested person in derivative litigation involving the Rospatch
Corporation. 6 This experience persuaded me that in shareholder derivative
litigation certain features of the Continental civil procedure model can be
combined profitably with the more adversarial United States model through
the medium of a disinterested person. Compared to litigation and the special
litigation committee, the disinterested person approach may offer the
following significant advantages: reduction of litigation costs, increased

procedural fairness, and greater protection of shareholders.
My argument contains two parts. First I will describe the imperfections in
the current models of shareholder dispute resolution that suggest a need for a
new alterative. Second I will describe advantages that the disinterested

person procedure may offer.
II
THE DILEMMA OF THE DERIVATIVE ACTION

The shareholder derivative action's essential purpose is to compensate
shareholders for losses suffered as a result of officer or director violations of
the duties of due care or loyalty. Shareholder derivative actions offer the
incidental benefits of deterring some forms of corporate cupidity, restraining
some wastes of assets, and accumulating some of the winnings from litigation
Instance Civil Procedure: Recent Reforms in German Civil Procedureand in the FederalRules, 63 Notre Dame L
Rev 609, 614-22 (1988).
4. Langbein, 52 U Chi L Rev at 826 (cited in note 3).
5. Mich Comp Laws Ann §§ 450.1491a(c), .1495 (West 1990); see generally Stephen H.
Schulman, Cyril Moscow & Margo R. Lesser, Michigan Corporation Law & Practice §§ 4.26, 5.3
(Prentice Hall Law & Business, 1990).
6. The Jerry Atcovitz v J. Grant Beadle, et al, derivative litigation was part of a consolidated
proceeding styled In re Rospatch Securities Litigation, 760 F Supp 1239 (WD Mich 1991).
On August 1, 1991, I filed a 339-page report, the recommendation of which was adopted by the
court inJerry Atcovitz vJ. Grant Beadle, et al, No 1:90-CV-807 (WD Mich 1991). This report was longer
than I assume usually will be necessary because I concluded both that (1) certain of the plaintiffs'
allegations were meritorious, but (2) the derivative action should be dismissed because each of the
meritorious allegations was also alleged in parallel direct federal securities actions. To ensure
appropriate recovery to the corporation, I recommended that the court apportion damages or
supervise settlement amounts in such a way that the individual derivative action defendants would
bear an appropriate share of any recovery in the direct actions.
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or settlements to the corporation for the equitable protection of creditors as
well as shareholders. 7 These are significant advantages.
But these virtues are achieved at a price, since a sizable share of derivative
litigation winnings go, not to the corporation, but to the plaintiffs' lawyers,
feeding the suspicion that the derivative action's true purpose is to enrich the
plaintiffs' bar. This is not a novel complaint, but merely echoes a critique that
can be directed at almost any aspect of plaintiffs' litigation ranging from
malpractice actions to environmental litigation. Alone, the notion that
plaintiffs' attorneys do well for themselves by doing good for others should
8
not be decisive.
Three factors, however, combine to make this traditional critique more
significant in the case of the derivative action. First, the shareholder
derivative action is sometimes unnecessary. For example, when material
misrepresentations or omissions can be alleged, they can be addressed
through a direct federal securities action rather than a derivative suit. In these
cases, the derivative suit's deterrent value has been reduced because of the
increased use during the last three decades of the federal securities law
antifraud remedies. The winnings from these claims redound to the same
outside shareholders who often are the indirect victors in derivative litigation.
Second, both derivative and direct actions have become increasingly
complex in the last few decades. Typically, federal securities law claims today
are joined to pendent state fraud actions, and often to civil RICO and state
consumer claims as well. This broad joinder means that discovery in a
shareholder derivative action typically begins with a very wide net capable of
enveloping documents of the corporation, its board of directors, its chief
officers, its outside attorney, its outside auditor, and often its subsidiary or
affiliated corporations. This blunderbuss discovery gives a greater ring of
truth to the old critique of the derivative claim, that it is extraordinarily
expensive and disruptive. When this critique is combined with additional
considerations of the increased hourly costs for attorneys, accountants, and
expert witnesses, the assertion that the derivative litigation can be "ruinous"
to a small- or medium-sized business cannot be entirely dismissed.
Third, there is a factor that verges on the historical accident: the
development of the special litigation committee. In the mid-1970s, several
hundred U.S. corporations were found to have paid "questionable payments"
or bribes through their overseas operations. Some of these corporations'
officers were also sued in derivative claims. But these were somewhat unusual
derivative suits. Although corporate officers may have committed legal or
moral wrongs, they could often claim that they did so to enrich their firms, not
to mulct them.9
7. For a recent review of the relevant literature, see Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit:
Litigation without Foundation?, 7 J L Econ & Org 55 (1991).
8. Compare John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder
Litigation, 48 L & Contemp Probs 5 (Summer 1985).
9. See, for example, Louis Loss &Joel Seligman, 3 Securities Regulation 660-61 (Little Brown, 3d

ed 1989).
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The law's response to these events was revolutionary. To limit the
derivative claim, a new technique, often called "the special litigation
committee," arose.' 0 The purpose, expressed or implied, of the special
litigation committee is to terminate derivative claims.
This is not to say that the special litigation committee is without merits. It
has the practical virtue of being far less expensive and disruptive than the
older derivative claim. On occasion it has also led to some changes in
corporate personnel or in corporate practice. "
There is another less subtle advantage of the special litigation committee.
In the past a court that believed that a shareholder derivative action was
lacking in merit often had two clumsy alternatives: either it could grant a
defendant's motion to dismiss summarily on the basis of the complaint,
essentially without discovery, or it could deny the motion, allow full discovery,
and typically allow the action to proceed to trial. From the court's point of
view, the special litigation committee had the advantage of ensuring that there
would be some internal discovery and some internal review of relevant
documents and relevant personnel before a climactic decision was made.
Moreover, in administering shareholder derivative actions, the court could
create incentives to attempt to make the process fairer. It could require that
there could be no adoption of the special litigation committee's
recommendation to dismiss unless the court was satisfied that all material
evidence had been discovered. It could require the special litigation
committee to meet with plaintiffs' attorneys or witnesses recommended by the
plaintiffs to ensure that part of the adversarial process was integrated into the
special litigation committee investigation. The court could take into account
efforts by the corporation to cleanse itself voluntarily. The court could be
more reluctant to grant dismissal if the personnel on the special litigation
committee appeared to be biased or the factual or legal analysis too crude or
too simple. These techniques would give the court supervising the special
litigation committee some opportunities to improve the process while
simultaneously reducing the derivative action's overall cost and disruption to
the corporation. 12
10. See, for example, John C. Coffee & Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An
Evaluation and a Proposalfor Legislative Reform, 81 Colum L Rev 261, 272-74 (1981); James D. Cox,
Searchingfor the Corporation's Voice in Derivative Suit Litigation: A Critique of Zapata and the ALI Project,
1982 Duke L J 959, 964-72; George W. Dent, Jr., The Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder
Litigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75 Nw U L Rev 96, 105-09 (1980).
11. These changes can be indirect. The initiation of the shareholder derivative claim and the
subsequent appointment of a special litigation committee can prompt the Securities and Exchange
Commission or relevant state securities officials to investigate the corporation. The filing of a
shareholder derivative claim might also have a direct and significant impact on the price of the
relevant corporation's stock. The key is that while the special litigation committee might directly
have been a device to dismiss derivative claims, indirectly it often coexists with other pressure for
reform.
12. See text accompanying notes 1 and 29.
Judicial ability to create incentives to make the process fairer, however, essentially is limited to
cases where a majority of the board is tainted by a lack of independence, and facts to this effect have
been alleged with sufficient particularity. See Aronson v Lewis, 473 A2d 805 (Del 1984); Grobow v Perot,
539 A2d 180 (Del 1988).
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Admirable as these techniques 'may be, they are not equivalent to the
advantages of the adversarial system in conventional shareholder derivative
litigation. Crucial witnesses, typically including relevant corporation officers
and directors, are interviewed only by the special litigation committee or its
counsel. Often the counsel is a distinguished law firm with a long record of
defending shareholder derivative litigation. This counsel usually has had
considerable courtroom experience and is well practiced in cross
examination. Nonetheless, such counsel does not have the same incentive to
probe or to question a witness' veracity or lack of memory as an adversarial
attorney would. Moreover, the penalties imposed upon a witness for memory
lapse or fabrication are considerably less than in a courtroom: the witnesses
often are not under oath; often their testimony is not transcribed; and usually
they are not subject to such penalties as perjury or even the courtroom
judge's moral suasion. Hence, claims that might not seem persuasive to ajury
or other fact finder in a courtroom might seem persuasive to a special
litigation committee's counsel, who is most psychologically prepared to accept
them.
There is also the question of whether a special litigation committee's
counsel has a sufficient evidentiary basis to question or doubt witnesses. To
be sure, a corporation will invariably open up its relevant files and records,
and provide the counsel with all documents from which a sufficient
evidentiary basis can be developed. But merely having documents is not
enough. It is more important to understand them fully. The special litigation
committee's counsel may miss or ignore disclosures or appropriate inferences
that could be drawn from these documents. This might occur, not because of
bad faith or lassitude, but simply because of the lesser incentive and time that
the committee's counsel has to find damning or incriminating evidence than
the typical plaintiffs' attorney has.
The choice between the traditional shareholder derivative lawsuit and the
newer special litigation committee approach to derivative litigation is not,
ultimately, a Manichean choice between good and evil. Shareholder derivative
litigation is unquestionably more expensive and disruptive to the corporation,
but it is also more likely to discover and prove that officers or directors have
committed legal wrongs. The special litigation committee, in contrast,
particularly when cabined by appropriate judicial procedures, is generally less
expensive, less disruptive to the corporation, and often less likely to discover
that corporate officers or directors have committed actionable wrong. The
choice is essentially between an expensive adversarial process and a less
expensive nonadversarial process.
To present only this stark choice, however, is unrealistic. The shareholder
litigation device, like federal securities law direct actions, does not exist in a
vacuum. It is part of a litigation process that more often than not results in
settlements.' 3 From this point of view, as the cost and capacity for disruption

I:

13. See, for example, William E. Haudek, The Settlement and Dismissal of Stockholders'Actions-Part
The Settlement, 23 Sw LJ 765 (1969);Janet C. Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements
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of shareholder derivative litigation increases, the plaintiff's bargaining
leverage expands substantially. On the other hand, the increased use of the
special litigation committee expands the defendant's bargaining leverage,
since the committee will usually recommend the action's dismissal,
terminating the plaintiffs' attorneys' right to a fee. Increasingly, the plaintiffs'
bar might face a Hobson's choice: either settle the litigation, typically
receiving fees for the plaintiffs' attorneys but relatively little for the actual
plaintiffs in the derivative litigation, or suffer the overwhelming probability of
defeat through dismissal of the shareholder derivative claim.
In response, many shareholders are increasingly litigating their derivative
claims simultaneously with separate federal securities claims. When this
occurs, the defendants may succeed in choking off the shareholders'
derivative claim through the special litigation committee, but they cannot
prevent the plaintiffs from going forward with the direct federal securities law
claim.
In this way, shareholder derivative litigation may appear to achieve a
certain "rough justice." The claim itself may be subject to the special
litigation committee's usual recommendation of dismissal. At the same time,
however, the plaintiffs' ability to wrest a substantial settlement (including a
substantial attorney's fee) is increased when the claim is litigated
simultaneously with a federal securities law claim and other pendent claims.
Thus, in a crude way, the law continues to ensure that derivative claims will be
filed and that corporations will pay some penalties for the misdeeds of their
officers and directors.
The big loser may well be the corporate shareholder. While nominally the
derivative litigation is in the shareholder's name, with recovery to go to the
corporation for the shareholder's protection, in reality the recovery in
shareholder derivative litigation typically goes, in large measure, to the
plaintiffs' bar rather than to the corporation. These effects are less substantial
in larger business corporations, where the practical significance of litigation
compared to the corporation's income or assets is proportionately smaller.
But in the medium-sized corporation in particular, the shareholder derivative
claim, far from being a panacea for the protection of stockholders' interests,
can be a disaster; the transaction costs of a clumsy process may dwarf the
possible recovery.
III
THE DISINTERESTED PERSON ALTERNATIVE

The Michigan Business Corporation Act's "disinterested person" is an
attractive alternative to both litigation and the special litigation committee in
shareholder derivative suits. The Act defines a "disinterested person" as "a
in Securities Class Actions, 43 Stan L Rev 497, 498 (1991) ("Although trial is our paradigm of how civil
litigation resolves disputes, in reality only a tiny fraction of litigated cases-perhaps five percent or
less-are actually tried to judgment." (citations omitted)).
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person who is not a party to a derivative proceeding, or a person who is a
party if the corporation demonstrates that the claim asserted against the
person is frivolous or insubstantial."' 4 The Act also provides:
The court shall dismiss a derivative proceeding if, on motion by the corporation, the
court finds that [one or more disinterested persons appointed by the court] has made
a determination in good faith after conducting a reasonable investigation upon which
its conclusions are based that the maintenance of the derivative proceeding is not in
the best interests of the corporation .

. .

. If the determination is made [by one or

more disinterested persons], the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that the
determination was not made in good faith or that the investigation was not
reasonable. 15

Neither the Michigan statute nor similar statutes adopted in other states
define the terms "best interests of the corporation" or "reasonable
investigation." 16

While the Michigan statute is not a jewel of definitional precision, the core
concept implicit in the role of the disinterested person is reasonably clear.
The disinterested person, rather than being a corporate employee or agent,17

14.

Mich Comp Laws Ann § 450.1491a(c). There is some risk with judicial appointment of a

disinterested person that "friends of the judge" might be appointed. The relevant corporation can
totally obviate this risk, when its counsel believes it is real, by not seeking appointment of a
disinterested person and simply proceeding to summary judgment. This risk is also reduced to the
extent that the report of the disinterested person is subject to some appellate review. The risk could
be further reduced by statutory or judicial procedures allowing the parties to challenge a list of
potential disinterested persons on grounds of competence, among others. In any event, "let not the

better be the enemy of the good." The disinterested person, warts and all, is more likely to be a
neutral fact finder than the special litigation committee.
15. Id § 450.1495.
16. See, for example, Alaska Stat § 10.06.435 (1989); Fla Stat Ann § 607.07401 (West Supp

1991); Ind Code Ann § 23-1-32-4 (West 1989); ND Cent Code § 10-19.1-49 (1989) (requiring
written report of its determinations to the board); Va Code Ann § 13.1-672 (Michie Supp 1992);
compare Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act-Amendments
Pertaining to Derivative Proceedings, 45 Bus Law 1241, 1246-53 (1990) (the "inquiry" concept in the

Model Business Corporation Act's § 7.44 provides an analogy to the Michigan reasonable
investigation concept). Both the Revised Model Business Corporation Act, see § 7.44(f, and The
American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations § 7.12 (Tent
Draft No 11 April 25, 1991) ("ALI Tent Draft No 11), also include the disinterested person
procedure, albeit using slightly different vocabulary.
There are other questions that could be addressed, such as:
(1) How should a disinterested person be selected? Should the parties have any role in his or
her selection?
(2) Should nonattorney disinterested persons be required to obtain an attorney's legal analysis?
(3) Who should bear the cost of the disinterested person review? Should this cost invariably be
imposed on the corporation or should a court have discretion to apportion part of the cost to the
plaintiffs or the defendants?
17. The Michigan statute permits a disinterested person to be a party to a derivative proceeding
"if the corporation demonstrates that the claim asserted against the person is frivolous or
insubstantial." Mich Comp Laws Ann § 450.1491a. On the other hand, § 450.1495 distinguishes a
"disinterested person" from a "disinterested director."
Given the rare involvement of a

disinterested person in a corporation's affairs, a better-phrased standard would require the
disinterested person to be totally uninvolved with a corporation for at least a minimum period before
appointment.
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should be a neutral fact finder similar to a trial court judge,I, a Bankruptcy
20
Code examiner,' 9 or the federal courts' Master.
This aspect of the disinterested person procedure is significant. One
much-stressed criticism of the special litigation committee is that directors
evaluating other directors will not be able to reach a disinterested judgment.
This concern has been variously expressed as " 'there but for the grace of
God go I' empathy,"' 2 1 "the danger of allowing the board of directors to
appoint a few 'good ol' boys' as a special litigation committee and to be
accordingly whitewashed," 2 2 or the "structural bias" of a special litigation
committee whose members were selected by defendant-directors. 23 However
phrased, the problem posed by such directors on a special litigation
committee is an obvious one. As one North Carolina court observed, "not
24
one committee, in all these instances, has decided to proceed with suit."

Another benefit of this system is that by appointing a disinterested person
to evaluate a plaintiff's derivative action claims, courts are likely to get an
evaluation equivalent to a conventional "business judgment." 2 5 Such an
evaluation essentially involves the same type of disinterested or arm's length
18. See, for example, Ward v Village of Monroeville, 409 US 57, 60 (1972) (characterizing the role
of the judiciary as "hold[ing] the balance, nice, clear and true between the state and the accused").
19. See, for example, Loss & Seligman, 4 Securities Regulation at 1657-67 (cited in note 9).
20. FRCP 53. See Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary K. Kane, 9 Federal Practice and
Procedure §§ 2601-2615 (West, 2d ed 1983).
21. Zapata Corp. v Maldonado, 430 A2d 779, 787 (Del 1981).
22. Abella v Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., Inc., 546 F Supp 795, 799 (ED Va 1982).
23. See Miller v Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 NW2d 709, 716-18 (Iowa 1983); Hasan v
Clevetrust Realty Investors, 729 F2d 372, 376-77 (6th Cir 1984); but see Aronson, 473 A2d at 815 n8;
Peller v The Southern Co., 707 F Supp 525, 527-28 (ND Ga 1988) (citing cases), aff'd, 911 F2d 1532
(11 th Cir 1990); Dent, 75 Nw U L Rev at 111 (cited in note 10) ("When charges are leveled against a
majority of the directors, the pressures on even nonimplicated directors are so great as to justify a
conclusive presumption that they cannot independently investigate and weigh the facts and reach a
conclusion that is in the best interest of the corporation."); see generally id at 111-17; Coffee &
Schwartz, 81 Colum L Rev at 283 (cited in note 10);James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the
Boardroom: Psychological Foundationsand Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 L & Contemp Probs
83 (Summer 1985).
24. Alford v Shaw, 72 NC App 537, 548, 324 SE2d 878, 886 (1985), modified, 320 NC 465, 358
SE2d 323 (1987); see also Cox, 1982 Duke LJ at 963 (cited in note 10) ("[A]lthough there have been
more than a score of special litigation cases to date, in all but one the committee concluded that the
suit in question was not in the corporation's best interest." (citations omitted)). Professor Deborah
A. DeMott, in her work ShareholderDerivative Actions: Law and Practice 98 (Callaghan, 1987)(1991 Cum
Supp), cites only one case in which a litigation committee recommended that the corporation sue
former officers, Kaplan v Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 529 A2d 254, 256 (Del Ch 1987). However,
none of these authorities addresses how often litigation committee reports have inspired or
recommended settlements.
25. Compare Auerbach v Bennett, 47 NY2d 619, 630-31, 393 NE2d 1000-01 (1979);Joy v North,
692 F2d 880, 885-87 (2d Cir 1982); In re Consumers Power Co. Derivative Litig., 132 FRD 455, 469, 483
(ED Mich 1990).
Under existing law, a disinterested person's (1) fact finding and (2) legal analysis and conclusions
are judicially reviewed under a business judgment standard. It is possible for a disinterested person
to find facts in a legally unassailable way but misinterpret or misapply the law.
I do not address in this article other questions that can be posed concerning judicial review of a
disinterested person's or special litigation committee's report, notably including whether the
standard of review should vary depending on the type of alleged wrong. For example, it can be
argued that there should be closer judicial scrutiny of self-dealing claims than of duty of care claims.
Compare ALI Tent Draft No 11 at § 7.10(b) (cited in note 16).
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cost-benefit analysis that a board of directors might undertake before
deciding whether to build a new plant or introduce a new product.2 6 In
contrast, courts in recent years have heard the complaint that special litigation
committees were not sufficiently independent 2 7 or that their legal analysis was
28
biased.
Though the disinterested person procedure can be undertaken for less
cost and entails less disruption than the special litigation committee,2 9 it is
also subject to the same type of procedural restrictions as the special litigation
committee. Significantly, however, the disinterested person can also perform
a role like that of the German investigative judge, helping to promote
settlements as the fact-gathering process unfolds. In Langbein's view of the
German model,
the tradition is strong that the court promotes compromise. The judge who gathers
the facts soon knows the case as well as the litigants do, and he concentrates each
subsequent increment of fact-gathering on the most important issues still unresolved.
As the case progresses the judge discusses it with the litigants, sometimes indicating
30
provisional views of the likely outcome.

The key is that the disinterested person procedure begins from a quite
different express or implied premise than the special litigation committee
procedure. While the appointment of a special litigation committee usually
results in a recommendation to dismiss derivative litigation, the disinterested
person procedure is more neutral and should provide a good faith,
intellectually honest effort to evaluate the merits of a derivative claim. The
disinterested person should not invariably conclude that derivative claims are
meritless. The disinterested person should evaluate claims on the merits for
the purpose of determining whether or not a claim is in the best interests of
the corporation.
This change in purpose should lead to important refinements in what is
meant by the pivotal statutory terms "best interests of the corporation" and
"reasonable investigation."

26. As Justice Brandeis wrote over seven decades ago in the context of a shareholder derivative
claim against an unaffiliated outside party:
Whether or not a corporation shall seek to enforce in the courts a cause of action for
damages is, like other business questions, ordinarily a matter of internal management and is
left to the discretion of the directors, in the absence of instruction by vote of the
stockholders. Courts interfere seldom to control such discretion intra vires the corporation,
except where the directors are guilty of misconduct equivalent to a breach of trust, or where
they stand in a dual relation which prevents an unprejudiced exercise ofjudgment ....
United Copper Sec. Co. v Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 US 261, 263-64 (1917). CompareJoy v North, 692
F2d at 887; Genzer v Cunningham, 498 F Supp 682, 688 (ED Mich 1980) ("where . . . there is no

allegation of personal gain by directors").
27. See notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
28. See, for example, Lewis v Fuqua, 502 A2d 962 (Del Ch 1985).
29. See text accompanying notes I and 12.
30. Langbein, 52 U Chi L Rev at 831-32 (cited in note 3).
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Best Interests of the Corporation

The Michigan statute creating the disinterested person procedure does
not define the phrase "best interests of the corporation." Although several
special litigation committee cases have defined this term, the typical
formulation is vague and of little operational help.3 1 For example, in Auerbach
v. Bennett, the New York Court of Appeals stated that the concept involves
"the weighing and balancing of legal, ethical, commercial, promotional,
public relations, fiscal and other factors familiar to the resolution of many if
32
not most corporate problems."
A more useful starting point appears in Joy v. North,3 3 where Judge Winter
considers "the best interests of the corporation" while discussing judicial
review of a special litigation committee's recommendations:
The function of the court's review is to determine the balance of probabilities as to
likely future benefit to the corporation, not to render a decision on the merits, fashion
the appropriate legal principles or resolve issues of credibility . . . . The court's
function is thus not unlike a lawyer's determining what a case is "worth" for purposes
of settlement.
Where the court determines that the likely recoverable damages discounted by the
probability of a finding of liability are less than the costs to the corporation in
continuing the action, it should dismiss the case. The costs which may properly be
taken into account are attorney's fees and other out-of-pocket expenses related to the
litigation and time spent by corporate personnel preparing for and participating in the
trial....
Judicial scrutiny of special litigation committee recommendations should thus be
limited to a comparison of the direct costs imposed upon the corporation by the
34
litigation with the potential benefits.

There are several aspects of this formulation that are attractive. Judge
Winter emphasizes, as most other judges have not, the inherently preliminary
nature of the work of a special litigation committee or disinterested person.
Unlike a court, a disinterested person must attempt to predict a likely
outcome before full discovery. Even if a disinterested person were able to
discover all or virtually all of the relevant documents that might be introduced
at a subsequent trial, it is highly unlikely that a disinterested person would
subject all possible witnesses to the same type of deposition process as used in
the pretrial stages of an adversarial litigation. In essence a disinterested
person is asked to make a prediction based on some, but not all, of the
information that would be available to a court if the matter were litigated.
A disinterested person, at most, can also only guess how a jury or other
fact finder will resolve issues of credibility or disputed testimony. While an
investigation that involves interviewing many potential witnesses may give a
31. See, for example, Auerbach, 47 NY2d at 633, 393 NE2d at 1002; Zapata Corp., 430 A2d at 788
(similar); Gaines v Haughton, 645 F2d 761, 767-68 nil (9th Cir 1981); Abella, 546 F Supp at 801 n13.
See also Cox, 1982 Duke LJ at 985-89 (cited in note 10); Robert K. Payson, Michael D. Goldman &
Gregory A. Inskip, After Maldonado -The Role of the Special Litigation Committee in the Investigation and
Dismissal of Derivative Suits, 37 Bus Law 1199, 1206-07 (1982).

32.
33.
34.

47 NY2d at 633.
692 F2d at 880 (2d Cir 1982).
Id at 892.
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disinterested person confidence that the judge orjury is likely to find facts in a
particular way, such predictions must be made with appropriate humility.
Juries sometimes surprise the most experienced litigator. Moreover, there
may be a greater likelihood of surprise at this stage of a disinterested person
(or special litigation committee) investigation than at a trial, given the
incompleteness of evidence available to the disinterested person, the
unlikelihood that a disinterested person will hear the equivalent to the
advocates' opening and closing statements, and the inability of a disinterested
person to see how the fact finder reacts to testimony or evidence.
1. Refining Joy v. North- PredictingLitigation Outcomes. For these and similar
reasons, one important refinement of Joy v. North would involve the use of
crude variables in predicting the probable outcome of a trial. Few assertions
are less reasonable than a prediction that a given litigation outcome is ninetynine percent (or whatever precise number) certain. No disinterested person
or special litigation committee should pretend to have that level of
confidence. Far preferable is the accounting profession's approach to
predicting "loss contingencies," including litigation outcomes, before one or
more future events occur or fail to occur.3 5 When a loss contingency exists,
according to FinancialAccounting Standards Board Statement No. 5, the likelihood
that a future event will confirm the loss can range from "probable" (meaning
"likely to occur") to "reasonably possible" ("more than remote but less than
likely") to "remote" ("the chance of the future event or events occurring is
slight"). Because corporate and securities law attorneys are involved in
responding to auditors' requests concerning pending litigation, 3 6 this is a type
37
of approach with which the relevant segment of the bar is already familiar.
In the context of a disinterested person or special litigation committee
investigation, crude predictions of likely outcomes are important for another
reason. There have been several suggestions that a calculation of the best
interests of a corporation should involve more than a litigation cost-benefit
analysis. 3 8 In some circumstances these alternatives to the basicJoy v. North
standard may be appropriate. Normally, however, it is preferable to subsume
35. Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement of FinancialAccounting Standards No. 5
3339 (1975) specifically concerns litigation.
36. See, for example, ABA, Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Requests for
Information, 31 Bus Law 1709 (1976);JamesJ. Fuld, Lawyers'Responses to Auditors-Some PracticalAspects,
44 Bus Law 159 (1988).
37. As two leading commentators have observed, "Although the FASB provided these
definitions, SFAS 5 did not include specific qualitative probabilities. Therefore, a good deal of
judgment is necessary in applying them." Robert S. Kay & D. Gerald Searfoss, Handbook of Accounting
and Auditing 26-27 (Warren, Gorham & Lamont, 2d ed 1989). Presumably they meant to refer to
quantitative, not qualitative, probabilities.
38. Among other variants to theJoy v North standard are the following:
(1) The American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance. Analysis and Recommendations
§ 7.10(b)(2)(A) (cited in note 16), would give special weight to improper benefits secured by
defendants "[a]s the result of a knowing and material misrepresentation or omission or other
fraudulent act" in evaluating the benefits to a corporation. "The policy judgment ... is that the long
term interests of shareholders will be better served if the derivative action retains a credible
deterrent threat over this range of cases ....
" American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate
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these other factors in a crude litigation cost-benefit analysis. Any effort to
calculate simultaneously both a litigation cost-benefit analysis and a value or
weight for such factors as the deterrent value of derivative litigation or the
impact of disruption on key corporate personnel will be necessarily
speculative and imprecise.
2. Refining Joy v. North- Application to Complex Claims. A second refinement
of theJoy v. North standard may be appropriate for complex derivative claims.
None of the special litigation committee cases to date has addressed the need
for any form of intermediate process. The expectation is simply that the
committee will file a report at the conclusion of its investigation.
In my experience as a disinterested person analyzing the derivative claims
in In re Rospatch Securities Litigation,3 9 which alleged twenty-two separate
possible causes of action, I found that the only practical way I could make the
Joy v. North standard operational was by pursuing a three-tiered investigation.
First, after the plaintiffs had submitted all documents that they believed
supported their complaint and I had received all requested documents from
the nominal defendant, Rospatch, I concluded that thirteen possible causes of
action alleged in the plaintiffs' complaint did not warrant further
investigation. These conclusions were either based on the lack of sufficient
Governance: Analysis and Recommendations § 7.08 at 151 (ALI Tent Draft No 8, April 15, 1988) ("ALl
Tent Draft No 8").
I am skeptical that improper benefits secured by defendants can be meaningfully distinguished
from other types of injury. For example, such an improper benefit might include a bonus received by
a corporation's senior managers as a result of a fraudulent overstatement of the corporation's
earnings. Why should this type of case be considered more serious than a fraudulent overstatement
of a corporation's earnings when the executive did not receive a bonus? In both cases the outside
shareholders are defrauded. In both cases the law should be concerned with deterring fraud.
Moreover, the supposed improper benefit, the bonus, may be of less consequence to the senior
executives than the greater job. security occasioned by the higher apparent earnings.
(2) In limited circumstances Judge Winter would take into account two indirect types of cost:
First, the impact of distraction of key personnel by continued litigation, and, second, potential lost
profits which may result from the publicity of a trial. Joy v North, 692 F2d at 892-93. When there are
simultaneous direct and derivative actions, the significance of these types of costs is substantially
reduced. Key personnel will be distracted and corporate profits threatened by the direct action
regardless of whether the derivative action proceeds. Compare Jerold S. Solovy, Barry Levenstam &
Daniel S. Goldman, The Role of Special Litigation Committees in ShareholderDerivative Litigation, 25 Tort &
Ins LJ 864, 879 (1990); Dent, 75 Nw U L Rev at 97, 129-30 (cited in note 10). For an analysis of a
special type of indirect cost that might be incurred by a public utility simultaneously involved in a
rate proceeding, see In re Consumers Power, 132 FRD at 483-86. Moreover, this type of factor usually
would support a recommendation that a derivative claim be dismissed regardless of the intrinsic
merits of the derivative claim.
(3) The American Law Institute, in evaluating the role of deterrence in a derivative action, would
also take into account "whether the legal rule [that] might otherwise result is largely dependent upon
private enforcement through proceedings such as the derivative action." ALI Tent Draft No 8 at 146
(cited in this note). Where there are parallel direct and derivative actions being litigated, the need to
rely on a derivative action to perform a deterrent role is reduced.
Often, there is also a countervailing consideration. Some courts and commentators have urged
that special consideration should be given to a corporation that voluntarily undertakes appropriate
corrective or disciplinary measures before or after demand has been made to initiate a derivative
action. See Stein v Bailey, 531 F Supp 684 (SD NY 1982); ALI Tent Draft No 8 at 130-31 (cited in this
note).
39. See note 6.

Page 357: Autumn 1992]

SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION

documentary evidence to justify bringing the case to a jury, or my
determination that the possibility of winning the case was "remote."
This standard involved two separate types of analysis. Before concluding
that there was insufficient evidence to go to a jury, 40 the plaintiffs were given
the opportunity not only to present relevant documents for my examination,
but also to explain their interpretation of the evidence. 4 1 For this type of
procedure to work, the plaintiffs must have access to all the relevant
documents.
The separate determination that the likelihood of a plaintiff winning a case
was "remote," in the sense of FinancialAccounting StandardsBoard Statement No.
5, would only be made if the plaintiffs could clear the summary judgment
threshold (that is, present sufficient evidence to go to the jury). A conclusion
that success on the merits is remote should be a rare result in those instances
when there is disputed testimony likely to go to a jury. Nonetheless, to avoid
what in great likelihood will be unnecessary expense, a disinterested person
should be permitted to conclude that the plaintiffs' case is so weak that further
proceedings could not be justified in the best interests of a corporation. The
alternative approach would require a full investigation of claims so weak that
the likelihood of success is "slight." To ensure that the disinterested person
does not abuse the power to reach this conclusion he or she should be
required to file a report with a court explaining, among other points, the basis
of each recommendation.
Second, after dispensing with the weakest claims, I conducted a fuller
factual and/or legal investigation into the remaining causes of action in
Rospatch. The purpose of this investigation was to determine if there was any
cause of action for which I believed it likely that the plaintiffs could
demonstrate (1) it was probable that there would be sufficient evidence to go
to ajury or other fact finder, and (2) the chances of prevailing before the jury
or other fact finder was greater than "remote." If those two criteria were met
I believed it would be appropriate to analyze the costs and benefits of further
proceeding. Clearly a cost-benefit analysis would be appropriate whenever, to
use the language of Financial Accounting Standards Board Statement No. 5, the
likelihood was "probable" that a jury or other fact finder would find in favor
of the plaintiffs. But even when the likelihood was only "reasonably possible"
(less than probable but more than remote) that the jury or other fact finder
would find for the plaintiff, an action would still be in the corporation's best
interests if the probable benefits (likelihood of success times reasonable
estimate of recovery) exceeded the probable direct costs of the litigation to
the corporation. For example, if it was concluded that the likelihood of
success was only one in three, but a reasonable estimate of the recoverable
amount equaled three million dollars, then the expected value of the suit
would be one million dollars. The suit should proceed as long as the
40.
41.

This procedure is different than summary judgment under FRCP 56.
See notes 53-54 and accompanying text.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 55: No. 4

probable costs to the corporation were less than the one million dollar
amount.
Third, on those causes of action where I concluded that the plaintiffs were
likely to present a case sufficient to go to a jury or other fact finder and the
likelihood of success was greater than remote, a cost-benefit analysis would
normally be appropriate. Here one would need to analyze: Who is likely to
be held liable in each cause of action? What is the likelihood that the plaintiff
will succeed on each cause of action? What is a reasonable estimate of how
much the corporation is likely to recover? What is a reasonable estimate of
the direct litigation expenses the corporation would have to bear? Here also
the issue of a corporation's indemnification insurance may become
particularly relevant both because of the difficulties of collecting damages
from individual defendants and because specific types of claims involving
42
intentional misconduct are not insurable.
B.

Reasonable Investigation

The concept of what constitutes a "reasonable investigation" is neither
defined in the Michigan statute nor explained in the Reporter's comments. 4 3
In the context of judicial review of special litigation committees in derivative
actions, a number of court decisions have analyzed what type of investigation
44
would be appropriate.
Generally, judicial authorities require a reasonable investigation recorded
in "a thorough written record of the investigation and its findings and
recommendations." 4 5 Commentators have further urged that the report
42. Throughout all of this analysis, a final aspect of the Joy v North standard is relevant. A
disinterested person must accept settled law as settled. Judge Winter implied as much when he
wrote that it is not the function of a disinterested person to "fashion the appropriate legal
principles." 692 F2d 880, 892. Although, in some instances, a disinterested person may have to
predict what the court will do when the law is not settled, even this prediction should involve a good
faith effort to estimate how a court analogizing from existing precedents is likely to analyze an issue
rather than a normative analysis of what the law should be. A disinterested person, or for that matter
a special litigation committee, must not lose sight of the fact that he or she, unlike a judge, is
unconfirmed and essentially involved in a limited ad hoc procedure.
43. Even given the independence and detachment that a disinterested person can bring to an
investigation, three commentators have stated of the Michigan statute:
Whichever group is to make the determination of the best interests of the corporation in
a given case, procedures should be adopted, particularly in the case of suits against
directors, that will support a finding of good faith and reasonable investigation under the
circumstances. The group should conduct an adequate investigation, including the use of
outside counsel or experts as appropriate, and it should prepare a written report detailing
the reasons for its conclusion. The scope of the investigation will depend upon the nature
of the allegations. The full expense and procedural formalities that have grown up around
special litigation committee practices are not necessarily required.
Schulman, Moscow & Lesser, Michigan Corporation Law & Practice § 4.26 at 139 (cited in note 5).
44. See for example, Auerbach, 47 NY2d at 634-36; Zapata Corp., 430 A2d at 788-89; Kaplan v
Wyatt, 484 A2d 501, 506-09 (Del Ch 1984).
45. Zapata Corp., 430 A2d at 788; compare Kaplan, 484 A2d at 510; In re General Tire & Rubber Co.
Securities Litig., 726 F2d 1075, 1085 (6th Cir 1984); Hasan, 729 F2d at 379 (failure to interview
individuals who could have provided crucial evidence).
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"should be required to describe with particularity the facts and assumptions
46
underlying each reason for [a] decision to oppose the derivative suit."
The investigation will usually involve interviews, which may be recorded in
typewritten summaries; 4 7 a review of relevant corporate, legal, and accounting
documents; 48 and an investigation, when appropriate, of prior work of the
corporate audit committee or prior depositions or examination transcripts
taken in earlier proceedings. 4 9 However, to the extent that there is reliance
on earlier work, the courts have required its verification. 50 In some instances,
a special litigation committee also has met with plaintiffs' counsel in the
5
derivative or related actions. '
A special litigation committee investigation will not survive judicial review
if it is found to be "so restricted in scope, so shallow in execution, or
52
otherwise so pro forma or halfhearted as to constitute a pretext or sham."
However, when an investigation is conducted in good faith, the courts have
found investigations "reasonable" even when they have criticized aspects of
53
the procedure or scope.
These special litigation committee precedents provide a good starting
point for analyzing the appropriate standards in a disinterested person
investigation. What is singularly missing from existing precedent, however, is
an appreciation of the psychological reality of a special litigation or
disinterested person investigation. Unlike a court or an adversarial
deposition, the investigation is conducted typically with a single investigator
meeting the potential witnesses and their counsel. Many, if not most,
witnesses will be defendants or allies of the defendants and whether coached
or not, will take pains to appear reasonable.
The investigator typically will spend a considerable period of time
interviewing the most significant witnesses. There are none of the
conventional devices found in litigation to fortify the investigator's skepticism
or, to use perhaps a better phrase, appropriate agnosticism. Unlike a trial or
deposition setting, no opposing counsel is present to interpose a hostile
46. Dent, 75 Nw U L Rev at 129 (cited in note 10). Compare Watts v Des Moines Register &
Tribune, 525 F Supp 1311, 1328-29 (SD Iowa 1981) ("[P]laintiffs may inquire into what factors
entered into the committee's decision, but not why such factors were considered or not
considered.").
47. See, for example, Kaplan, 484 A2d at 511, 517; Rosengarten v Buckley, 613 F Supp 1493, 1497,
1501-03 (D Md 1985); Pe~ler, 707 F Supp at 528.
48. See, for example, Auerbach, 47 NY2d at 635; Holmstrom v CoastalIndus., Inc., 645 F Supp 963,
976 (ND Ohio 1984); Rosengarten, 613 F Supp at 1495, 1503.
49. See, for example, Auerbach, 47 NY2d at 635; American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate
Governance: Analysis and Recommendations § 7.10 at 36 (Tent Draft No 9, April 14, 1989).
50. See Stein, 531 F Supp at 687, 694; Peller, 707 F Supp at 529; compare Genzer, 498 F Supp at
696.
51. See Maldonado v Flynn, 485 F Supp 274, 284 (SD NY 1980), modified, 671 F2d 729 (2d Cir
1982); compare Abbey v Control Data Corp., 603 F2d 724, 727 (8th Cir 1979) (plaintiff declined an
invitation to meet with a special litigation committee).
52. Auerbach, 47 NY2d at 634; Stein, 531 F Supp at 695.
53. See, for example, Kaplan, 484 A2d at 518-20; Rosengarten v International Tel. & Tel., 466 F
Supp 817, 825-26 (SD NY 1979) (omission did not cast serious doubt on overall thoroughness of
investigation).
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cross-examination or a timely objection. The investigator, when witnesses are
not under oath, has no real ability effectively to remind a witness of the
penalties for perjury. While an investigator can reach conclusions about the
likelihood that a witness will appear persuasive to a jury or other fact finder,
this type of conclusion arguably has little place in a final report. In sum, the
very nature of the proceeding is biased in favor of not finding fault or of
minimizing fault.
Here, too, the German model of civil procedure is different. At one stage,
counsel for both parties may be present at the interrogation of each witness,
may suggest questions to the judge, or, after the judge has completed an
54
interrogation, may pose additional questions.
These conventions would probably be regarded as inconsistent with the
informality and streamlining of discovery sought to be achieved through the
disinterested person procedure. Alternatively there are certain mechanical
steps that could be taken to minimize the bias in the disinterested person
process, but each of them involves tradeoffs. For example, there may well be
advantages to having the witnesses sworn in and testimony recorded by a
court stenographer. This step, however, should not be taken lightly. The
informality of the disinterested person procedure has the advantage of
eliminating virtually all objections from counsel to lines of questioning. This
may dramatically streamline the time involved in discovery and stimulate
witnesses to speak more candidly than they would on a record.
It seemed preferable to me in attempting to create an evenhanded
disinterested person process to integrate the most desirable aspects of an
adversarial process into the disinterested person's investigation. In the
Rospatch investigation this was facilitated by the fact that virtually all relevant
documents were stored in a document depository. 5 5 This meant that I could
direct the plaintiffs to submit to me all documents that they believed tended to
support the positions advocated in their complaint with memoranda
explaining the significance of the documents produced.
After I had reviewed all of the plaintiffs' document submissions and other
documents that I received from Rospatch, I circulated to the parties a
statement specifying the issues that I believed did and those that did not
justify further investigation. After that statement was circulated, the
defendants were given the opportunity to forward for my review all
documents that they believed supported their positions with memoranda
explaining the significance of the documents they produced.
I took several steps to ensure that I did not merely receive relevant
documents but understood them. First, as mentioned, to assist me in
evaluating the documents provided by the parties, I offered both the plaintiffs
54. Langbein, 52 U Chi L Rev at 824, 828 (cited in note 3). Compare Benjamin Kaplan, Arthur
T. von Mehren & Rudolf Schaefer, Phases of German Civil Procedure1, 71 Harv L Rev 1193, 1199-1202,
1208-10, 1232-37 (1958).
55. See In re Rospatch Securities Litigation, et al, Nos 1:90-CV-805, 1:90-CV-806, 1:90-CV-807,
1:91-CV-085, slip op at 9 (WD Mich March 14, 1991), 1991 US Dist LEXIS 3270 *9 (Greeley).
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and the defendants the opportunity to attach memoranda explaining the
documents' significance. Second, I selected a consultant on accounting
standards and the analysis of accounting work papers. Third, I took other
steps to ensure that I received a critical analysis of the relevant accounting and
auditing issues. For example, I interviewed the plaintiffs in related direct
litigation. Each of these individuals was an accountant who provided me with
an adversarial analysis of relevant accounting and auditing issues. I also
interviewed certain of the plaintiffs' potential fact witnesses and stated my
willingness to receive affidavits from potential expert witnesses for either side.
Fourth, on several occasions I requested that the parties file briefs addressing
specific questions concerning the relevant legal and accounting standards to
be applied in this case.
These procedures replicated some of the adversarial presentations likely
to occur at trial, and through them I was able largely to allay the legitimate
concerns of both plaintiffs and defendants that I would not discover all that I
should or that I would not understand what I discovered.
It has not always been the case that plaintiffs have had the same access to
documents as the plaintiffs did in the Rospatch derivative action. I believe it
often would be preferable if they have such access. Only when plaintiffs'
counsel critically reviews the relevant corporate and accounting documents
can a court be confident that a fair process has occurred. The court can also
then fairly impose a burden of production on plaintiffs similar to that
appropriate at trial. 56
To be sure, document production can be expensive. But there are better
ways in a fair process to limit expense than by cutting off a plaintiff from
document production. First, the court can issue a stay, preventing the parties
from conducting depositions. Properly armed with both plaintiffs' and
defendants' documents and explanatory memoranda, this is an appropriate
role of a disinterested person.
Moreover, a key advantage of the disinterested person procedure is that,
to a greater extent than the special litigation committee, it can limit the
number of interviews and the amount of document production when and if it
becomes clear that the plaintiff's case is essentially nonmeritorious. Because
the disinterested person begins as a neutral fact finder, his or her judgment
should be entitled to greater weight in reaching this conclusion than that of a
special litigation committee.
Even when the plaintiff has filed a meritorious claim, economies can be
achieved because of the disinterested person's control over discovery. For
example, the most challenging aspect of the Rospatch investigation was
effectively to distinguish those claims which, after review of documentary
evidence and explanatory memoranda, I did not believe warranted further
investigation from those issues where further investigation was warranted.
Unlike a court, which has well-recognized opportunities to dismiss claims
56.

See, for example, Edward W. Cleary, et al, McCormick on Evidence §§ 336-38 (West, 1984).
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through motions practice before a full trial on the merits, a disinterested
person or special litigation committee has no recognized intermediate process
in its investigation. Yet the Rospatch derivative case began with a complaint
that asserted twenty-two different causes of action that varied widely in their
persuasiveness. I was additionally concerned that without some device to
focus the attention of the parties on the issues where further investigation was
warranted, additional document production by both sides would be clumsy
and ill-focused, and persons that I sought to interview would have little
guidance in how to prepare appropriately. Finally, I was aware that any party
challenging the recommendations of the disinterested person report would
have a substantial burden of persuasion. 57 As a matter of fairness I sought to
ensure that all parties were offered every reasonable opportunity to bring to
my attention relevant documents or arguments before I filed my final report.
The primary device I employed to narrow the issues and focus the
investigation was a Summary of the Documentary Evidence Reviewed to Date
by the Disinterested Person. 58 The Summary was prepared after an extensive
period of document review but before any interviews had been conducted. 5 9
The Summary itself contained two parts. Part I identified the issues that
required further investigation. This Part essentially summarized or quoted
the documentary evidence available to me by that date and highlighted areas
where legal briefs would be requested or factual investigation would be
necessary. On a few issues I announced that I would request only legal briefs
since the relevant facts did not appear to be in dispute but the applicable law
was uncertain. The purpose of Part I, in essence, was to narrow the focus of
the investigation to those issues where there was a reasonable basis to believe
that the plaintiffs might have alleged a complaint sufficient to go to ajury and
the likelihood was greater than remote that the plaintiffs would prevail. This
narrowing occurred both in the sense of focusing the investigation on a
shorter list of issues, and, equally significantly, by focusing the factual
investigation on a specific time period.
Part II of the Summary outlined the issues that I believed could be
resolved without a full investigation. I intended this Part to be written in
similar detail as the final report. The plaintiffs were given the opportunity to
persuade me that I had reached an incorrect conclusion concerning these
issues when I met with plaintiffs' counsel after distribution of the Summary.
At meetings with plaintiffs' and defense counsel, I discussed with the
parties a list of persons I believed appropriate to interview on the issues that
57. See notes 52 and 53 and accompanying text.
58. Compare the preliminary report procedure employed by the Examiner, In re Revco, D.S. et al,
Nos 588-1305, 588-1308 through 588-1321, 588-1761 through 588-1812, and 588-1820 (Bankr ND
Ohio Prelim Rep, July 16, 1990; Final Rep, Dec 17, 1990).
59. The Summary was accompanied by a cover letter which stressed: "This document
tentatively states my conclusions as to which issues require further investigation in the Rospatch
derivative action and which do not. These are only preliminary conclusions." Letter to Jill S.
Abrams, David D. Joswick & Jon G. March, from Joel Seligman, May 9, 1991.
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then appeared to warrant further investigation. As my review of documents
and conduct of interviews proceeded, I added additional individuals.
The interviews were conducted employing "informal" procedures and
were not transcribed or tape recorded. Handwritten notes were made and,
after most interviews, I dictated into a tape recorder interview notes that were
subsequently typed. To ensure the accuracy of these notes, the parties and I
had agreed initially to a procedure under which I would circulate my notes to
the person interviewed to provide an opportunity for correction or
amplification. After Rospatch's counsel objected that this procedure might
jeopardize Rospatch's ability to claim that the notes were privileged or
confidential, I adopted an alternative procedure. I did not circulate my notes
to any person interviewed for correction or amplification. Instead, when I
intended to rely on the notes and I believed the point on which I would rely
could reasonably give rise to controversy, I either re-interviewed the person
on that specific point or requested an affidavit. In retrospect, the affidavit
procedure proved particularly useful in preparing the final report.
Certain interviews were conducted by telephone. These typically were
interviews on specific and quite narrow points or were corroborative "reinterviews" related to earlier investigations where a signed and sworn affidavit
had been produced.
I interviewed each defendant in person. In each interview with a
defendant I articulated the evidence I had found that was likely to be
presented by the plaintiffs at a trial to attempt to demonstrate the liability of
that particular defendant. My purpose was to understand the likely defense
each defendant would offer. I tried to reduce the possibility that the
defendants might be more effective at trial after interrogation and deposition
in my investigation by offering to receive a further written affidavit or
statement from each defendant on each issue where I believed it was
reasonably possible that a jury or other fact finder would find liability. In
"confronting" each defendant, I did not use an adversarial tone. I viewed my
role as that of a fact finder, not an advocate conducting a hostile crossexamination. At the same time, I articulated to each defendant in
considerable detail the exact bases for possible culpability. I was insistent in
probing for responses and, on occasion, told defendants that I did not believe
that a jury would be persuaded by a response. I wanted to know if the
defendant could offer a more persuasive response or if I had heard the best
that was likely to be offered.
Before I filed my final report I urged the parties and the Rospatch
litigation committee to settle four specific issues. In two instances I indicated
to the defendants that I had not reached legal conclusions concerning specific
issues but as a preliminary matter I thought there was some likelihood that the
defendants might lose these issues. This prompted Rospatch and various
defendants to "unfund" an indemnification trust and to resubmit to
shareholders two supermajority provisions where there was a question of
whether a sufficient vote had initially been cast to adopt the provisions. On
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two other issues I suggested to individual defendants and Rospatch that there
was a significant likelihood that I would conclude that it was probable that the
individuals had violated the relevant law. Given all of the facts involved, I
stated that I would recommend to the court a settlement by which these
individual defendants would return to the court all indemnification advances
received to date and Rospatch would agree not to bring a derivative claim. In
performing this role in the settlement process, I made it a point to state all
conclusions to both sides. If I recommended a settlement to a defendant, I
explained the recommendation and the reasons for it to the plaintiffs. At the
same time I did not participate in settlement negotiations. I simply stated to
the parties that I would support certain settlements but I left it to the parties
60
to negotiate them.
IV
CONCLUSION

The procedures

employed in the Rospatch derivative litigation were

responsive to the circumstances that the court and I faced in that case. These
procedures may not be fully appropriate in other contexts.
The advantage of the disinterested person approach is that it provides the
judiciary a new alternative in resolution of shareholder derivative litigation.
Unlike the special litigation committee that, in my opinion, has been criticized
appropriately for its overwhelming tendency to favor defendants, the
disinterested person procedure offers the legislature or judiciary an
opportunity to employ a more neutral approach while at the same time
preserving the advantages of reduced cost and disruption associated with the
special litigation committee approach. In relatively smaller corporations, the
disinterested person may also be viewed as a "bargain" compared to the
special litigation committee. When the disinterested person is a lawyer, he or
she does not need to hire separate counsel and can perform a role trying to
help inspire settlements that would be more difficult for counsel to a special
litigation committee to perform.
Nonetheless the most significant potential use of a disinterested person
probably will be in applying the law to complex facts. Here the disinterested
60. The parties were able to negotiate successfully the four specific issues but not an overall
settlement. I had hoped that my distribution of the documentary Summary would prompt an overall
settlement. In this instance it did not.
The filing of the final report prompted discussion of a number of questions I will leave to others
in the bench and bar, such as: Should the report be a public filing in a litigation process or subject to
limitations on its distribution? Should the report, if adopted, have collateral estoppel effect in
related direct proceedings? If not, should the report have evidentiary value? As a general matter,
the simultaneous litigation of direct and derivative lawsuits raises a host of complex problems. It
should also be noted, however, that, as stated, a direct lawsuit can reduce the need for a derivative
claim to perform a deterrent function and, at least in Rospatch, the existence of the direct claim
significantly simplified the role of the disinterested person by causing virtually all relevant documents
to be directly produced to the plaintiffs. This meant that the derivative lawsuit plaintiff, not the
disinterested person, read through close to 300,000 pages of documents to separate the wheat from
the chaff.
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person can perform a useful "triage" role, distinguishing meritorious from
nonmeritorious claims and sharpening the understanding of the court and
parties with respect to the facts concerning meritorious claims. In contrast,
cases involving simpler fact patterns will have less need for a disinterested fact
finder. Chancellor Brown's complaint that the special litigation committee
procedure essentially sets up "a form of litigation within litigation" is equally
applicable to the disinterested person procedure. 6' If there is a need for
either alternative approach, the need will be generally limited to complex
cases where a protracted investigation is warranted.
With complex cases, a significant issue suggested by Rospatch is whether
the appointment of a disinterested person should be solely on a motion from
the corporation or whether it also might be made by the court on its own
initiative. Since the corporation will normally bear the cost of hiring the
disinterested person, there is a principled basis for limiting the person's
appointment to those cases in which the corporation desires it. On the other
hand, the court will usually have a quite realistic sense of when this type of
procedure may simplify fact finding and conceivably inspire settlements.
On balance I believe the. disinterested person model worked well in
Rospatch. However, the area in which it seemed to be most in need of
improvement was the role of the disinterested person in helping inspire
settlements. One advantage the German model may have over the
disinterested person procedure is that the presence of counsel at each witness
interview may make a German judge's evaluation of likely outcomes seem
more credible than the opinions of the disinterested person. The
disadvantage of having counsel of both sides present at the interviews might
be felt in terms of a lesser willingness of witnesses to speak candidly and fully.
There are other factors that may militate against the disinterested person
being as effective as a German investigative judge in inspiring settlements. In
Rospatch, these factors included the use of informal procedures and the fact
that the judge, not the disinterested person, ultimately issued opinions. It
may well be that the disinterested person will be more effective in helping
inspire settlements only when he or she is joined by the judge in settlement or
other periodic conferences. Like much else in a procedure only employed
once to date, this is an area where a certain amount of trial and error will be
appropriate.
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